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UNODC

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime







Table of Contents

Table of Contents	2
Chair Letters.....	3
Ori Gavish	3
Shai Milstein.....	4
Introduction to the Committee	5
World Drug Problem.....	5
Organized Crime.....	5
Corruption and Economic Crime.....	5
Terrorism	6
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice	6
Topic A: The Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners & the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons	7
Key Definitions and Concepts	7
Background to the Topic.....	8
Prisons and the Cycle of Violent Extremism	8
Violent Extremist Prisoners: Different Approaches	10
The Current Situation	13
Questions to Consider	13
Bibliography and Further Reading.....	14
Topic B: The Influence of Organized Crime on Politics	15
Background to the Issue	15
Potential Cures.....	17
Questions to Consider	18
Bibliography	19



Chair Letters

Ori Gavish

Hello delegates and welcome to the ATIDMUN VII UNODC Committee. My name is Ori Gavish, I am in my final year of high school. I study and live in Tel Aviv and will serve as your chair in this committee. I have been participating in Model United Nations Programs for 4 years, both in Israel and abroad. I am incredibly excited and can't wait to meet all of you. This year we have two intriguing topics that hold one of the most important places on the world agenda.

I am confident that all of you will bring a unique perspective to the issues, resulting in a lively debate.

I anticipate defending your resolutions and solutions to the problems.

I look forward to meeting all of you on our committee.

Sincerely,

Ori





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Shai Milstein

Hey everyone, I'm Shai, a 12th-grade student originally from Brazil, and I'm currently studying at WIZO Hadassim, in Even Yehuda. Diplomacy has been present in several different situations throughout my school years, and since I moved to study abroad in Israel, it has become a significant part of my life. Now I'm helping to run my school's MUN club while having fun, learning more about the local culture, and trying to pronounce the letter "ר" successfully.

I'll be looking forward to being your chair at the upcoming ATIDMUN, in the UNODOC committee. I'm sure we'll all have a great time together! Moreover, in case of any questions, further information, or simply you want to help me to pronounce the "ר", I'll be delighted to reply to every and all messages sent to my email: shaimilstein@icloud.com.

I've been doing MUN for over three years now, and it never gets old! It is always a marvelous experience, and I'll be more than glad to share this good time with you. I delegated five times already, and this will be my third time chairing. During this time, I made new friends, improved my English a lot and, and learned about the diplomatic field. I believe that MUN is the perfect scenario for all of this to happen. Finally, with such an exciting topic, we have the perfect recipe for success and fun! I'm so excited to meet all of you guys.

See you all at the conference!





Introduction to the Committee

UNODC's mission is to contribute to global peace and security, human rights and development by making the world safer from drugs, crime, corruption and terrorism. This Strategy for the next five years will equip UNODC to deliver effectively, efficiently and with accountability, elevating our support to Member States to build just, inclusive and resilient societies that leave no one behind.

UNODC addresses the following five normative areas of activity:

World Drug Problem

- Improved prevention, treatment and care
- Effective criminal justice responses to trafficking
- Greater access to controlled medication for those in need
- Sustainable alternatives to illicit drug cultivation
- Strengthened international law enforcement cooperation
- Better understanding and monitoring of illicit drug markets

Organized Crime

- Effective legal frameworks to combat transnational organized crime
- Improved investigation and prosecution of criminal cases, and assistance to victims
- Better responses to cybercrime
- Greater and more timely analysis and monitoring of trends

Corruption and Economic Crime

- Strengthened legal, policy and institutional frameworks to counter corruption
- Increased cooperation among and between institutions at the local, national and international levels
- to prevent and counter corruption



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- Fast track implementation of the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) review mechanism
- recommendations

Terrorism

- Effective and accountable criminal justice responses to terrorism
- Increased international cooperation related to terrorism and its financing
- Application of human rights compliant measures to prevent terrorism and protect its victims
- Better programmes to prevent and counter violent extremism which can lead to terrorism

Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice

- Strengthened access to justice for all, particularly the most vulnerable
- Effective, community and knowledge based crime prevention
- Better prevention of violence and increased access to gender responsive justice
- Strengthened prevention of and responses to violence against children
- Reforms to ensure safe and humane custody of prisoners



Topic A: The Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners & the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons

Key Definitions and Concepts

There are many different definitions for radicalization and violent extremism, and this abundance of definitions means that there is no single accepted definition by the international community. However, some definitions are accepted by a rather large number of countries and are thus more useful to us in our discussion. For instance, the Council of Europe has developed Guidelines specifically intended for Prison and Probation Services Regarding Radicalization and Violent Extremism which sets out the following definitions:

Violent extremism is defined as ‘promoting, supporting or committing acts which may lead to terrorism, and which are aimed at defending an ideology advocating racial, national, ethnic or religious supremacy and opposing the core democratic principles and values. The commentary to the Guidelines stresses that they are not concerned with the adoption of radical political opinions, but with the undemocratic adoption, promotion and support of violent means to obtain demands.

There are many types of violent extremism, and they can be placed on a spectrum ranging from right-wing to left-wing violence, which also includes other types of political, social, religious or other ideologically related violence. The common element in this spectrum is the ideological basis of violence.

Radicalization is ‘a dynamic process whereby an individual increasingly accepts and supports violent extremism. The reasons behind this process can be ideological, political, religious, social, economic or personal.



Since radicalization is defined in terms of violent extremism, we shall begin our analysis with violent extremism, and only then proceed to discuss radicalization.

Background to the Topic

Prisons and the Cycle of Violent Extremism

All violent extremists prisons require special attention and specific approaches since it is known (for reasons that will soon become clear) that individuals motivated by ideological drivers represent a different type of threat than other violent offenders and exhibit different characteristics.

The UN plan to prevent violent extremism was released in 2016. It was accompanied by a Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly (A.70.675). In it, the United Nations advised creating a comprehensive approach for the problem, which would combine both security-based measures of counterterrorism and addressing the underlying drivers and conditions that move people to violent extremism.

As part of this plan, the UNODC has published a handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons. The UNODC Handbook provides practical guidance on key management policies and mechanisms, such as meeting international standards for prison conditions, training staff in humane and non-discriminatory treatment of prisoners and preventing corruption. The Handbook also deals with preventing radicalization to violent extremism in prisons and preparing violent extremist prisoners for reintegration into the community. It stresses that any efforts in prison to address violent extremism must not lead to undermining human rights to which all persons, including violent extremist prisoners, are entitled. However, prison managers should not forget that while both violent extremists and other criminals may employ violence to attain specific goals, most violent extremists are motivated by ideological, religious or political gain and believe that they are fighting for a cause.

When it comes to prevention of violent extremism with a focus on the individual violent extremist offender (VEO), there are multiple opportunities to have interventions. These start at the earliest stages with prevention measures - education, for example - and continue as the criminal enters the criminal justice system. Once they have re-entered society, whether it was after serving a custodial sentence or not, there is again a need for prevention measures to reduce the risk of recidivism. In this way, counterterrorism regarding the individual is a cycle which can be broken down into several stages (see Figure 1), each of which presents its own opportunities for a person to break away from violent extremism. For some, this may occur at the earliest stages but for some individuals the cycle might continue.

One of the stages of this cycle is the community. The community is also one of the influential social layers surrounding each individual offender, even at their time of detention. For the perpetrator to go through a deradicalization process, good community support is very much a requirement. Therefore, when it comes to offender rehabilitation and reintegration, communities have a crucial role to play as they can serve as the foundation to rehabilitate and reintegrate offenders in numerous ways. For example, certain UN projects used religious and youth leaders to de-radicalize their community members.




Figure 1. *The cycle of violent extremism.* Based on work done by the UNCIRI.



Breaking the cycle in prisons creates different and unique challenges. In prisons, the offender will often sit with like-minded individuals and other criminals. The first group can not only prevent any deradicalization process but also lead to further radicalization. As valuable as a community is to de-radicalize violent extremists, a toxic community can also significantly hurt their progress.

Furthermore, violent extremist prisoners could radicalize the rest of the prisoners. When discussing the matter of the management of violent extremist prisoners and the prevention of radicalization to violence in prisons we seek not just to prevent the further radicalization of the perpetrators but also to prevent them from radicalizing other prisoners.

Violent Extremist Prisoners: Different Approaches

This highlights the benefits and disadvantages of two different approaches regarding the placements of violent extremist prisoners. One approach is to separate them from the general population of the prison. While this renders the radicalization of other prisoners nearly impossible, it could hurt the chances for the rehabilitation of violent extremist prisoners, which would mean that they might still be a threat to society when they return to it.

The other approach is to mix them with the general population. While this approach could enable the rehabilitation of violent extremist prisoners, it could also lead to a radicalization of non-violent extremist prisoners. This is problematic since it is well known that many extremists were radicalized in prisons.

In any case, the wellbeing and role of the prison staff that work with extremist prisoners must be taken into account. Managing the prison staff and any other person interacting with them is extremely important. Prison staff have an obligation to protect, maintain and uphold the human dignity of all offenders, including violent extremist prisoners. Prison staff who are to work with this challenging category of prisoners should be carefully selected for their integrity, humanity, professional capacity, personal suitability and ability.



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Prison administrations should have a clear policy to encourage suitable individuals to apply to work in prisons holding violent extremist prisoners, which should include clear instructions to the staff on how to treat this type of prisoners. Prison staff should maintain high levels of professional standards and ethics at all times when working with violent extremist prisoners, and they should receive special training for working with violent extremist prisoners.

Appropriate support mechanisms should be put in place to enable staff to cope with the stress of working in prisons that hold violent extremist prisoners.

Furthermore, prison administrations should take appropriate steps to ensure the personal safety of staff who work in these prisons, both while on duty and while outside of the prison, including their family members.

We should note that prisoner radicalization is not in itself a threat to the prison administration or society if not connected to violence. Not all radicalization is negative or a precursor to violent extremism. Only a very small number of radicals become violent extremists. In addition, any efforts in prison to address violent extremism must not lead to undermining fundamental human rights to which all persons, including violent extremist prisoners, are entitled, including the freedom of thought, religion or belief, and the absolute prohibition of torture.

Good prison and probation management should apply to all offenders including violent extremist offenders and should support rehabilitation efforts for everyone. Recruitment and training of prison and probation staff members who are empathetic and engage with offenders in a constructive and positive manner will facilitate understanding of violent extremist inmates including their ideology and their personal motivations. Such information is relevant to both an accurate analysis of their unique needs as well as their risk status. It also facilitates a positive environment with other inmates and can facilitate engagement in broader positive aspects of prison life. Rewarding individuals for good behaviour is intended to encourage participation in counter-radicalization programs for violent extremist offenders and those at risk of radicalization to violence. Equitable



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disciplinary sanctions together with positive incentives can serve to facilitate trust, the perception of justice in the prison environment and can support a cognitive opening to change that is essential to all offenders and may be particularly relevant to those who are violent extremists.

While community and other environmental components can contribute to the de-radicalization process and improve it significantly, it should be noted that they almost never start it, nor do they drive it by themselves. De-radicalizing inmates usually involves intervention. The term intervention here generally refers to any actions or activities which directly or indirectly contribute to the rehabilitation of violent extremists, or which prevent offenders from committing extremist offences. The emphasis here is on interventions which require human interaction in correctional settings and personal change in the offender, such as to their actions, beliefs, identity and relationships. Interventions may range from specialist, targeted programs, to more general activities (such as education, employment or occupational activities) to conversations between staff members and offenders.

Interventions to counter extremism and extremist offending may require a different focus from those used to address other forms of offending behaviour.

Interventions may need to focus on:

- 1) Preventing individuals from committing (extremist) offences for which they have no prior history of committing;
- 2) Preventing individuals from developing an interest in or involvement with particular groups, causes or ideologies; and
- 3) Changing an individual's relationship with a particular group, cause or ideology.

In interventions also need consider the extent to which resources and efforts should be focused on targeted approaches to address these specific issues This has to be considered against the impact general approaches such as good conditions, policies, processes or activities may have on these issues such as dynamic security, minimising staff corruption and staff treating offenders with decency and respect.



The Current Situation

As we have stated in the beginning of the Study Guide, it outlined the strategy employed by the Council of Europe. And yet, this is not how every country treats its violent-extremist prisoners. Most countries, for example, have reportedly used torture techniques on violent extremist prisoners so as to get information from them about terrorist activities against the state. While these methods are widespread in non-Democratic countries, countless allegations have been made against Democratic countries as well, such as the United States (in Guantanamo Bay) and Israel (in its treatment of prisoners suspected of terror activities).

There is also a question as to whether every violent-extremist could be rehabilitated. Many people claim that some offenders are unchangeable, and that releasing them back into society will just put the members of society in danger. Therefore, it could be said that one must assess the human-rights violations that could be made by releasing these prisoners into account.

This is your dilemma. It affects not only prisoners, but society as a whole.

May luck forever be in your favor.

Questions to Consider

Read the question and try to think/find out what your country's position on the major topics and points of debate is, such as the ones below:

- 1) What is the best course on a global scale to move forward? Note that the UN counter-terrorism doctrine at the moment is that the member states do most of the action, and it's not this committee which decides on the general plan.
- 2) How is this committee going to prevent regular inmates (such as thieves or drug traffickers) from going through radicalization to violent extremism?
- 3) What is your country's plan on deradicalizing violent extremist prisoners, if any?



- 4) Where does the red line between protecting the regular inmates and staff and the extremist's rights and conditions go?
- 5) How does my country deal with violent extremist prisoners?
- 6) What are the conditions in my country's prisons overall?

Bibliography and Further Reading

- [A/RES/70/291](#)
- [VEP - radicalisation - violence - prisons](#)
- [Preventing radicalisation in prisons](#)
- [Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons](#)
- [Summary-of-recommendations-on-VEPs.pdf](#)
- [Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism | Office of Counter-Terrorism](#)
- [UNOCT_PVEReferenceGuide_FINAL.pdf](#)
- https://unafei.or.jp/publications/pdf/RS_No104/No104_6_VE_Bo logna_2.pdf
- <https://rm.coe.int/16806f9aa9>
- <http://www.unicri.it/strengthening-efforts-prevent-and-counter-violent-extremism>
- <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/about-unodc/index.html>



Topic B: The Influence of Organized Crime on Politics

Background to the Issue

It is generally agreed upon that a state should act according to its interests. This could mean anything from "the interests of its people" to some other form of "general good". However, politicians don't always act in the best interests of the state – they could attempt to benefit themselves or some groups that are close to them. These *interest groups* gain influence over politicians in several different ways, most notably political donations or their ability to influence a large number of voters. Some influence groups are viewed as legitimate, like people who advocate for fresh water supply, climate activism or, in some states, civil rights. Other influence groups are more controversial, such as large corporations who advocate for lower regulations.

One of the more problematic interest-groups that could influence politicians is organized crime. In contrast to ordinary crime, in which the crime is usually performed by one person, organized crime consists of a large number of people working together to perform some sort of long-term criminal activity, the most common of which are drug production and trafficking, illicit arms trade and human trafficking. Most organized crime activities are done with the interest of making profits. Since these are very large enterprises that involve a large number of people and engage in highly illegal behavior, they often result in huge profits for its members, and grants the criminal organization a position of influence over its 'customers' and over locals.

This influence is relevant to our discussion since it could carry over into the political field. There are a number of reasons for the motivation of criminal organizations to get involved with politicians, but the most common is that the state controls the police and other enforcement agencies. Thus, if a criminal



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organization was able to get the police to 'avert its eyes' to its activities, it would be able to continue and even expand its criminal actions.

Generally speaking, there are three major avenues through which organized crime can gain influence over politicians. The first of these three is influence through money. As we have previously stated, large criminal organizations often earn large profits, which makes it possible for them to bribe corrupt officials with large sums of money. Corruption is a very effective tool to use; in the developing world, the corrupt ties between government officials and criminals are viewed as the number one concern by citizens. Corrupt ties can run far deeper than the occasional bribe – for example, the lack of enforcement on political contribution laws could enable criminal organizations to hand out political donations to any party that favors them.

This leads us to the second avenue of influence: mutually beneficial relations. This is used to indicate cases of long-term interactions between politicians and criminals that aim to benefit both sides. Politicians have much more to gain from criminal organizations than money – votes. By ways of violence and the threats of such, criminal organizations can control voters: they can use these illegal methods to motivate the public to vote for certain political leaders or parties, and can also use the same methods to make it impossible for people to vote, and thus block voting for opposing parties. For example, in the United States of the 1870s, the Ku Klux Klan – which were aligned with the southern Democratic Party - physically prevented black voters from voting by using violence, which ultimately led to the end of the Republican majority in all southern states. Criminal organizations can also motivate voters in non-illegal ways. Most notably, these organizations usually have very good personal connections with the local population, and their prestige means that their political opinions matter.

The third avenue of influence is through violence and threats of violence. If criminal organizations are strong enough, they could force politicians or state officials to comply with their demands by threatening them, blackmailing them or



assassinating non-complying officials. Threats can take the form of physically harming the individual or their family if they do not obey. These threats are meant to deter any politician from taking action against organized crime, and in many cases they work. Sometimes, however, politicians do not comply with the threats. In these cases, the criminal organizations take action. María Santos Gorrostieta Salazar, a mayor of the Mexican town of Tiquicheo, was a powerful figure in the fight against organized crime. During her short tenure as mayor (2008-2011), she was the target of three assassination attempts, one of which killed her first husband. She did not resign following these attempts, and finished her term as scheduled. However, lacking the police protection that aided her when she was a public figure, a fourth assassination attempt in 2012 proved successful, and she was killed.

The ability of criminal organizations to influence politicians enables them to do much more than ensure their existence. By building systems of political patronage – be them voluntary or not – with high-ranking politicians, they could gain access to some of the state's core mechanisms. They could influence state legislation in order to better their interests. They could influence judges or police detectives to get away with crimes. In Guatemala, local criminal organizations even managed to forge relations with Edgar Barquin, the central bank governor between 2012 and 2016, which enabled them to print money.

Potential Cures

As we have seen, the ties between politicians and criminals could be difficult to spot, let alone sever. They are prevalent in countries with weak and corrupt central and local governments, or countries in which the police and the courts are too weak to enforce the law. Thus, two cures become crucial: rooting out corruption from the government, and strengthening the police force and the courts.

However, one should immediately see the problem with both solutions – in both cases, the current government has no incentives to change, as that will put the current politicians themselves in risk of conviction. To simplify, let us assume that



some state has a large number of politicians which have connections to organized crime. These politicians would not want to enact anti-corruption laws, and they would certainly oppose any legislation that would strengthen the police or the courts.

Therefore, the biggest question that your committee faces is an interesting one: how can you lower the level of influence that organized crime has on politics, when the problematic countries have no interest in complying with your resolution? Moreover, let us assume that some of these countries do wish to be set free from the grasp of organized crime – how can that be achieved without triggering widespread assassinations of crime-opposing politicians by organized crime until they are replaced with politicians who fulfill their wishes? Keep in mind that the UNODC can only advise countries how to act, and only the Security Council can forcefully intervene in internal affairs of countries.

Even though it doesn't seem like there is much to be done, millions of people are living under constant fear from organized crime. Their countries either cannot help them or do not want to help them. Inaction is not an option. Even the smallest of changes can create meaningful change for so many.

May luck forever be in your favor.

Questions to Consider

- Who are the prominent criminal organizations in your country?
- How powerful are criminal organizations in your country?
- Are there any known or suspected ties between politicians and these criminal organizations?
- How corrupt are your country's politicians?
- Are the ties between politicians and criminals in your government so close as to make it within your interests to keep them that way and oppose resolutions that try to solve the problem?



- How strong are your legal institutions? Is corruption common within the legal system?
- Are your legal institutions independent from the interests of politicians?
- Has your country successfully prosecuted criminals and/or corrupt politicians in the past?
- How strong is your police force? Are there any regions controlled by organized crime?
- What do you think should be done to solve the problem?
- How can the international community as a whole and the UNODC in particular help solve this problem?

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