



AFRICAN UNION





TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents.....	1
Chair Letters.....	3
Ilana Atadjanov	3
Yinon Rubinov.....	4
Eitan Unger	5
Introduction to the Committee.....	7
Topic A: African Union Army	8
Background to the Topic.....	8
African Standby Force.....	8
Current Situation.....	9
Introduction.....	9
Colonialism and Ethnic Biases.....	9
The Army and Politics.....	10
Expenses and Conditions.....	10
The Need for Regional Cooperation.....	11
Key countries.....	11
Egypt.....	11
Nigeria.....	12
South Africa	12
Questions to Consider	13
Familiarizing Questions.....	13
Clash-Oriented Questions	13
Bibliography.....	14
TOPIC B: Terrorism in the Sahel (G5 Sahel and Boko Haram):	15
Background to the Topic.....	15



AtidMUN 2022



The Terrorism in the Sahel.....	15
The G5 Sahel	15
Terrorism and Terrorist Groups in the Sahel	16
Current Situation.....	17
Questions to Consider	20
Familiarizing Questions.....	20
Clash-Oriented Questions	20
Bibliography.....	20



CHAIR LETTERS

ILANA ATADJANOV

Hello delegates!

Welcome to the African Union committee at Atidmun 2022!

My name is Ilana Atadjanov and I'll be one of your chairs.

I'm a 17 years old student from Sharet high school Netanya and I'm majoring in Physics and Diplomacy. I love watching anime and TV shows. I also like baking and sleeping.

I have been doing MUN for the past two years. During those years I have been a delegate and a chair in many conferences. From my experience I have learned a lot about diplomacy and international relations, I have met new people, made new friends, and had a lot of fun.

I hope your experience in this committee, and this conference will be amazing. Take a stand and stand up and speak, learn new things, meet new people, make new friends, and most importantly have fun and continue going to conferences and be your best self! :)

I wish all of you good luck, if you need any help, email me and I'll be happy to help:
ilanka162005@gmail.com

See you all soon!

Sincerely,

Ilana Atadjanov





AtidMUN 2022



YINON RUBINOV

It is with great pleasure and excitement that I welcome you to the African Union committee in AtidMUN2022. I cannot wait to see you all debate, work together, and, most importantly, have a great time!

I am 17 years old from Ramla and I study at Atid Lod High School. This year will be my third and sadly, last year of MUN-ing. I cannot begin to explain how much fun I have had being a part of this fantastic community. Joining my school's MUN club has helped me improve my English, enriched my vocabulary, increased my confidence, developed my leadership skills, and so much more. This conference would be the first time I'm chairing so I'm looking forward for it!

Other than MUN-ing, I like to work out, spend a lot of time on woodcraft. My favourite animal is bird and I'm volunteering at "For the Wild Animals" and my role is to treat the wounded birds and I enjoy it so much.

If you have any questions or want to say hi and introduce yourself to us before the conference, please contact us.

Sincerely,

Yinon Rubin





AtidMUN 2022



EITAN UNGER

Dear delegates, it is with pleasure I welcome you to the 2022 ATIDMUN AU committee!

My name is Eitan Unger and I'll be one of your chairs.

I am 17 years old, and I am from Hadassim high school. I major in Physics and CompSci. I like reading (I have really enjoyed anything cosmere and currently read "The Magician King"), computers, video games, languages and puzzles. I am also in the scouts.

I've been doing MUN since 2018, and have been to various conferences, as a delegate and a chair. During those 4 years, I have widened my horizons, learned a lot about international issues and also how to speak and work in a team, met new friends, and did so many things I never thought I would, or could- and enjoyed it a lot!

I will do my best during the conference, and hope you all will too. Feel free to speak, meet new people, and try new things! This committee is great and I hope you'll have as much fun during the conference as I had preparing for it.

I am here for anything you need, conference related or not, so feel free to contact me! (At eitanung@gmail.com)



AtidMUN 2022



Glad to have this opportunity, and see you all there!

Sincerely,

Eitan





INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMITTEE

The African Union (AU) is a continental union that consists of 55 member states in Africa. The African Union has been in action since July 9, 2002, and serves as the successor to the Organization of African Unity (which operated from 1963 to 1999).

The African union possesses many organs, all with different functions and responsibilities. In the African Union, the supreme policy and decision-making organ is called "The Assembly of Heads of State and Government". The Assembly is responsible for all formal AU policies, priorities, and annual programs as well as their implementation. The Assembly has the added responsibilities of electing a chairperson for the AUC, admitting new AU members, adopting the AU budget, amending and interpreting constitutions, approving structures of the AU Commission, and determining the structure of the Executive Council. In order to make decisions, The Assembly is required to have a two-thirds majority vote by the Member States. During the regular procedures, a simple majority is enough.



TOPIC A: AFRICAN UNION ARMY

BACKGROUND TO THE TOPIC

AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE

Many areas in the African continent have been plagued by civil wars and war crimes in recent years: The Kamwina Nsapu Rebellion, the Anglophone Crisis, the Tigray War, and the Ethnic Violence in South Sudan are only the tip of the iceberg (Wikipedia, 2022). Uneven distribution of wealth and power, as well as high unemployment, have caused crime in Africa to rise significantly and has turned it into a significant socio-economic crisis. Africa is ranked 2nd of 5 continents in the Global Organized Crime Index, being only slightly below Asia with a score of 5.17. In comparison, Oceania had an index of 3.07. Additionally, Africa is ranked last in its Resilience score (Global Organized Crime Index, 2021).

One possible solution to the crisis is the creation of an African Army, meaning closer military cooperation on the African continent - a unified force with which to mitigate regional conflicts. In principle, the African Army would have the responsibility of ensuring peace in the region. The army would have permission to intervene in a Member State in cases of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity, as stated in terms of the Constitutive Act. The idea started to gain traction with the creation of the African Standby Force (ASF) in 2003 (Dessau & Yohannes, 2022). The idea was further developed in 2013, expanding their rapid deployment capabilities and their capacities for immediate response to crises. However, the idea is still not in consensus: countries in the African Union still debate whether a unified army is desired, advisable, or even necessary to guarantee lasting security and peace in the region (Akiyama, 2019).

In addition, the AU has had trouble with implementing its plans for a unified army: The bodies in charge of the ASF, such as the Regional Mechanisms (RM) and



Regional Economic Communities (REC), have not given sufficient funding to the ASF, leading it to be severely understaffed. Due to this, the demand for a better, more organized version of the ASF is on the rise.

The ASF is a multifaceted body, consisting of military, police, and civilian personnel who are on alert in their home countries and prepared for quick deployment. This is to prevent cumbersome political and technical burdens when attempting to deploy forces into crisis situations. The ASF is responsible for many things: observation and monitoring missions, peace support operations and peacebuilding, deployment to prevent escalation, humanitarian assistance in the face of natural disasters, and other functions mandated by the heads of state.

CURRENT SITUATION

INTRODUCTION

There are many issues in establishing and preserving an African army. Just to name a few: corruption, instability, and abuse of power are some of the significant concerns regarding such a powerful body (Krippahl, 2022). If the soldiers in a united African army abuse their post in order to engage in illicit trafficking activities or abuse the rights of civilian populations, it would be hard to hold them accountable. However, despite the billions of dollars invested into the security sector, the cost of not having established, strong, and professional militaries is high: persistent instability, chronic poverty, deterred investment, and stunted democratization.

COLONIALISM AND ETHNIC BIASES

The colonial era has had a massive impact on the form and structure of African nations today – one of the most significant impacts is the formation of ethnic biases in the military.



During the colonialist era, colonizers opted to create regional armies from the local ethnic minority in order to counter-balance the difference in populations. However, when they left, colonizers didn't bother to prepare the generals for a military transition. As a result, post-independence regimes were extremely unstable. Army generals weren't ready to give up their power – so they organized coup d'états. After conflicts had died down, governments had the opportunity to rebuild armies in their vision, but that was detrimental to their success: ethnic and tribal biases that the government had now took shape in the troops as well, and constant politicization of the military stunted its expansion. Despite its supposed reform, African militaries are usually comprised of the same minorities as before the liberation, meaning that the army only represents a small population, and lacks trust from the majority.

THE ARMY AND POLITICS

Because the military and political branches of the government are so closely intertwined, they often impact each other for the worse. African militaries, which possess significant amounts of corruption, also have physical means of coercion that they can use to their advantage. On the flip side, if armies are faithful to the government, but the government itself is corrupt – it can lead to some of the most brutal forms of repression.

Moreover, politicization in the army slows it down – which leads to military unprofessionalism. However, there have been efforts to fight this phenomenon: Certain African countries have made praiseworthy efforts to improve the professionalism of their militaries. However, there still is much room for improvement (Ouédraogo, 2014).

EXPENSES AND CONDITIONS

African countries are also suffering from budget and human resources issues. Let's take South Africa as a case study: In 1994, South Africa formed the new "South African National Defense Force" (SANDF). The South-African government hired



many people with medium-term contracts. However, they failed to provide appropriate exit mechanisms when contracts expired, so many opted to stay in the force. This phenomenon led to an aging force and a failure to rejuvenate it due to a lack of funds. Additionally, a declining defense budget has made it extremely difficult for the army to renew its equipment, maintenance, and infrastructure. Currently, the SANDF does not have sufficient funding for the effective functioning of the infantry, air combat, maritime combat, and special operation units – which limits its scope of operations significantly (Heinecken, 2021).

THE NEED FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION

Conflicts in the African Region have turned from national conflicts into regional ones – spanning multiple countries. First, terrorist organizations are active in multiple countries: Boko Haram is happening in Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon; Al-Qaeda is active in Mali, Somalia, and Yemen; and Al-Shabaab is engaged in Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia. Second, poverty and instability are abundant in the region, leading to higher crime rates around the African continent. Finally, each individual army needs to deal with a myriad of other challenges: intra-state armed conflicts; proliferation of small arms and light weapons; child soldiers; mercenaries; cross-border criminality; refugees and internally displaced persons; and the spread of deadly diseases.

All those challenges point to one of two solutions: The first, uniting the individual African militaries into one big African Army. The second, develop regional militaries to the point where they can resolve national conflicts on their own.

KEY COUNTRIES

EGYPT

Egypt is situated at the crossroads of Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and, arguably, Europe as well. In 1954, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser identified the three



focuses of Egyptian foreign policy as being “the Arab, the African, and the Islamic,” but not necessarily in that order. Geography matters, and Egypt has essentially pivoted its foreign policy towards the Middle East and Europe. During the Cold War, it became apparent that Africa was not the first, second, or even third priority. But as we pursued in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, Egyptian focuses changed, and now would be on the U.S., Europe, and the Arab Gulf States.

NIGERIA

Nigeria also stands out in West Africa, and ECOWAS, as a massive Anglophone nation in the middle of Francophone Africa. In 1970, Nigerian Foreign Minister Bolaji Akinnyemi introduced the term Pax Nigeriana. Based on the idea of Nigerian hegemony in Western Africa, Nigeria would build a foreign policy and military strategy around maintaining its dominance in the region. By doing so, Nigeria hampered the deployment of combat-ready AU forces to support its image of stability and regional hegemony at the cost of internal security and AU unity.

SOUTH AFRICA

Today, South Africa remains a significant player, because it represents a “product of international needs for African representation on the global stage, together with its own ambitions, rather than any regional consensus on South African leadership.”^[lxx] This desire by the international community for South Africa to succeed can be seen through its position on the United Nations Security Council, inclusion in BRICS, and the G20. Despite its apparent success, however, as South Africa deals more with domestic problems, it is less likely to focus on supporting the PSC. Today, South Africa’s regional power is atrophying as its economy continues to stagnate and political unrest swells. Furthermore, South Africa continues to be plagued by xenophobic riots against migrants who are blamed for taking away jobs from South Africans. These riots continue to isolate South Africa from its neighbors who have loudly criticized its policies towards African unity. Like Nigeria, South



Africa continues to push for its own interests to be a global power player at the cost of a united AU diplomatic front. Because of South Africa's desire to be recognized as a middle power by Asia and the West, it is unlikely to act primarily with the interests and support of the African continent in mind. Unfortunately, this means that South Africa must choose between losing "the support of the continent or the international community's own enthusiasm for it."

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

FAMILIARIZING QUESTIONS

- How big is my country's defense budget? Is it sufficient for the proper functioning of the army?
- What can and can't my country's military do? What holds it back?
- What kinds of instability does my country face? (Is my country facing terrorism and war crimes, or more national crime organizations? Perhaps a combination of both?)
- What are the crime rates in my country?

CLASH-ORIENTED QUESTIONS

- What is the role of a united African Army, such as the ASF, in the future of African peacekeeping?
- Will the foreign military play any role in establishing the AA infrastructure?
- If your country supports a unified African Army, should the African Union expand on the ASF, or rather establish a new system from the ground up?
- If your country does not support a united African Army, how would you suggest developing existing national militaries?
- Should each country expand its defense budget, or is the reallocation of resources enough? How will that be done?
- Should a united African Army be established; how will it be funded?



- How can an African Army benefit your country?
- How can your country contribute to the African Army?

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Akiyama, C. (2019). Constraints on an “African Solution:” How Regional Interests Interplay with the African Standby Force. Retrieved from The Yale Review of International Studies: <http://yris.yira.org/essays/3698>

Dessu, M. K., & Yohannes, D. (2022, June 2). Can the African Standby Force match up to current security threats? Retrieved from Institute for Security Studies: <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/can-the-african-standby-force-match-up-to-current-security-threats>

Global Organized Crime Index. (2021). Criminality. Retrieved from Global Organized Crime Index: <https://ocindex.net/rankings?f=rankings&view=List&group=Continent>

Heinecken, L. (2021, July 26). Military not a magic bullet: South Africa needs to do more for long term peace. Retrieved from The Conversation: <https://theconversation.com/military-not-a-magic-bullet-south-africa-needs-to-do-more-for-long-term-peace-164717>

Krippahl, C. (2022, January 19). Examining the poor reputation of Africa's armies. Retrieved from DW: <https://www.dw.com/en/examining-the-poor-reputation-of-africas-armies/a-60481228>

Ouédraogo, E. (2014, July). Obstacles to Military Professionalism. Retrieved from Africa Center For Strategic Studies: <https://africacenter.org/publication/obstacles-military-professionalism/>

Wikipedia. (2022, September 22). List of conflicts in Africa. Retrieved from Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_conflicts_in_Africa#21st_century



TOPIC B: TERRORISM IN THE SAHEL (G5 SAHEL AND BOKO HARAM):

BACKGROUND TO THE TOPIC

THE TERRORISM IN THE SAHEL

The Sahel is an eco-climatic and bio-geographic area in central Africa and includes parts of Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea, and Ethiopia. The Sahel is also a geostrategic territory with many structural problems: It is one of the world's poorest areas, and it is plagued by climate change, population growth, food insecurity, corruption, crime, and violent extremism. Consequently, the region's countries are marginalized technologically, economically, and politically (Brito, 2021).

During the decolonization of regions in Africa, European colonizers left the Sahel region with weak governmental systems, a scattered cultural identity, and an overall lack of administration and infrastructure. Countries within the Sahel region were left with flunking militaries, that command very few resources to this day: The combined military expenditure of the G5 Sahel member states amounts to only about \$1.2 billion (0.07% of global spending). Soon after, the Sahel region became a hot spot for terrorist activities of insurgent groups or Jihadist-Salafist organizations close to al-Qaeda or the Islamic State (IS).

THE G5 SAHEL

After the beginning of the Tuareg Rebellion in northern Mali in early 2012, President Amadou Toumani Touré was ousted in a coup due to the inadequate response of the government by army mutineers. Even though Mali called for the intervention of the French military, the rebellion still left Mali quite vulnerable. Terrorist organizations such as the Ansar Dine and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad took advantage of



the situation, seeking refuge in the immense desert swaths and planning their future attacks (Cherbib, 2018).

Countries within the region had enough of the constant instability, the rising threat of terrorism, and all of the other problems plaguing the Sahel area, and so – Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger established the G5 Sahel in 2014. The G5 Sahel is a framework meant to serve to coordinate its members' development and security policies. In 2017, the G5 Sahel established the G5 Sahel Joint Force, with the aim of fighting the jihadist terrorist groups in the area (Such as Boko Haram and the ISWA) (European Parliament, 2020).

The G5 Sahel Joint Force (or FC-G5S, for 'Force Conjoint G5 Sahel') was launched in July 2017 in Bamako (Mali). Pooling the five countries' resources to fight terrorism, human trafficking, and organized crime in the region, and has about 5,000 staff. The African Union Peace and Security Council authorized the military component of the G5 Sahel in April 2017. The UN Security Council (UNSC) has expressed its support for the G5 Sahel in two resolutions: Resolution 2359 calls on the international community to provide logistical, operational, and financial assistance, and Resolution 2391 provides for active logistical support to the G5 Sahel Joint Force through MINUSMA.

TERRORISM AND TERRORIST GROUPS IN THE SAHEL

The development of a Jihadist scene in the Sahel has been strongly shaped by a volatile local and regional context. These groups presented themselves as defenders of the local population against alleged abuses by the state. In order to reinforce the local communities' confidence in them, some Jihadist-Salafist leaders have entered marriages and kinship affiliations, gaining trust and influence in local dynamics (Cherbib, 2018). Much of Eastern Africa has been carved up under several regional



leaders, allied with Ansarul Islam, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahel (ISGS), and Mali's al-Qaida-affiliated Nusrat al-Islam (JNIM). There appears to be no conflict between the factions; according to Savadogo, they use the same techniques, meaning they probably have ordinary trainers. The terror groups' method of operation is quite similar and nourished by the slowly fading governments and authorities in the Sahel. The region's allegedly occupying governments are weak and poor. They don't try to, or cannot offer any solution or aid to help the oppressed citizens that are remote from them in the desert. People are screaming for help, and get it from the terrorist groups flooding the area that are trying to be some kind of version of a "Robin Hood" - saving the unfortunate. Masses of people in the Sahel's rural areas prefer to be bent under the strong arm of the terrorists, in order to survive and be respected as humans, which they lacked from getting from the origin-issued governments.

Most Sahelian terrorist groups have established formal links with ISIL or Al-Qaida. Terrorists are taking advantage of territorial control and ethnic conflicts to radicalize the population and recruit. The financing of local Sahelian terrorist groups is growing, and there is a concern that radicalization is increasing the threat level. Funding sources include kidnapping for ransom, theft, and extortion by the hijacking of vehicles with their cargo. The predominance in the region of the cash economy, without controls, is conducive to terrorist groups funded by extortion, charitable donations, smuggling, remittances, and kidnapping for ransom. ISIL and Al Qaeda-affiliated groups in the Sahel benefit from "taxing" the flow of drugs, goods, and individuals through the territory in which they are active (Wikipedia, 2022).

CURRENT SITUATION

Between 2007 and 2021, deaths from terrorist attacks have risen about 10x, and make up 35% of the global deaths in terrorist attacks, and all this is despite the decline of



Boko Haram, a prominent terrorist group in the Sahel area do to various reasons such as the death of their leader Abubakar Shekau in 2021.

Since late 2018, communal conflicts, many of them over access to food, water, or productive land, have produced thousands of deadly attacks across the Sahel region. Nearly 4,800 people died in conflicts from November to March, according to the violence-monitoring group ACLED. As the global focus on terrorism shifts away from the battlefields in the Middle East, jihadists and other militants, including those affiliated with al Qaeda and the Islamic State, have begun seeking out the unstable regions in sub-Saharan Africa. The Sahel has been particularly vulnerable to this shift due to its perennial tumult and poverty. But now, there are signs that the region's militant spell has begun seeping into the West African countries and to the south of the continent as well. This could have drastic consequences for some of the continent's most prosperous economies, such as Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, as well as their chief military partner, France.

Niger had the most significant increase in deaths from terrorism, with casualties more than doubling over the past year. This is the highest terrorism death toll in the country since 2007.

Earlier this year (January 2022), Burkina Faso became the latest G5 Sahel country to experience a coup d'état. On January 23, 2022, Gunshots were heard outside the presidential residence of Burkina Faso, and near several military bases in the area. The military group behind the coup reported they were in command of the military bases in the city, while the government denied any reports of a coup. A few hours later, it was reported the president was detained by military personnel. The next day, the military announced on TV the president was deposed and the parliament dissolved, so the group took command of the country (Wikipedia, 2022).



Meanwhile, contingents from Mali, which had coups d'état in 2020 and 2021, have not been participating in the joint force. The G5 Sahel defense ministers have not met since November 2021, and the annual heads of state summit of the G5 Sahel, usually held in February, has not yet taken place. Mali would have acceded to its rotating presidency at the Summit, but other G5 members reportedly oppose that. For now, Chad remains in this role. Relations are particularly strained between Mali and Niger.

In May 2022, Mali declared its withdrawal from the G5, leaving the group in a yet worse situation than it was in 2021 (Agence de Presse Africaine, 2022). Because of that, several member councils have voiced their concern, calling for the establishment of a UN support office and predictable financial backing, a call backed by France's delegate to the UNSC. Many members of the UNSC have also pointed out the unimaginable rate at which the Sahel situation is worsening and showing regret regarding Mali's decision.

In addition, the USA and the UK point out Mali's relation with the Wagner Group, a Russian federation-backed military organization actively undermining peace and stability in the Sahel area, and the UK calls for an investigation regarding Malian troops and Wagner Group militants massacring civilians in Mali, conducted by the MINUSMA (The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali). On the other hand, Russia supports Mali's decision to leave the G5 and points out the connection of western mercenaries to the many recent coup d'états in the area, and the impact of the Western and Economic Community of West African States' sanctions against Mali.



QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

FAMILIARIZING QUESTIONS

- Is your country occupied by terror organizations?
- What has your country done to fight terror in the past?
- Is your country relying on international assistance in order to stake control?
- Was your country a part of any counter-terrorism dialog, or is it at the present?

CLASH-ORIENTED QUESTIONS

- What is the role of the G5 Sahel alliance in the future of peacekeeping in the Sahel region?
- Should the African Union reinforce and expand the current G5 Sahel, or should it establish an alternative organization from the ground up?
- What can be done in order to eliminate the causes of the growing percentage of terror attacks in the area?
- What is your country's rank in the Corruption Perception Index? What influence may it have on terrorism in your country or in the Sahel region?
- Does your country have any suggestions to resolve the issues within the G5 Sahel?

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Isaac. "Organized Criminal-Terrorist Groups in the Sahel: How Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Approaches Ignore the Roots of the Problem." OUP Academic, Oxford University Press, 12 July 2018, <https://academic.oup.com/isp/article-abstract/19/4/344/5052711>

Rakowski, Stephen. "As Terrorists Settle Into the Sahel, West Africa Prepares for Battle." Stratfor, Stratfor, 29 May 2019, <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/terrorists-settle-sahel-west-africa-prepares-battle>



“Looking for Unity in the Sahel.” Atlantic Council, 26 Sept. 2019, atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/looking-for-unity-in-the-sahel/.

Agence de Presse Africaine. (2022, May 16). Why Is Mali Leaving G5 Sahel? Retrieved from African News Agency: <https://www.africannewsagency.com/agence-de-presse-africaine/why-is-mali-leaving-g5-sahel-48b43675-b5a8-5e1a-b75f-a666603fbad3/#:~:text=Mali%20announced%20on%20Sunday%20evening%2C%20May%2015%2C%20its,to%20assume%20the%20presidency%20of%20this%20regional%2>

Brito, P. M. (2021, June 15). Religious terrorism in the Sahel. Causes, means, and impact. Retrieved from Universidad de Navarra: https://www.unav.edu/en/web/global-affairs/detalle?p_p_id=com_liferay_blogs_web_portlet_BlogsPortlet&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&_com_liferay_blogs_web_portlet_BlogsPortlet_mvcRenderCommandName=%2Fblogs%2Fview_entry&_com_liferay_blogs_w

Cherbib, H. (2018). Jihadism in the Sahel: Exploiting Local Disorders. Retrieved from IEMed: <https://www.iemed.org/publication/jihadism-in-the-sahel-exploiting-local-disorders/>

European Parliament. (2020, September). The G5 Sahel and the European Union. Retrieved from European Parliament: [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/652074/EPRS_BRI\(2020\)652074_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/652074/EPRS_BRI(2020)652074_EN.pdf)

Wikipedia. (2022, September 20). 2022 Burkina Faso coup d'état. Retrieved from Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Burkina_Faso_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat

Wikipedia. (2022, September 25). Boko Haram. Retrieved from Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko_Haram